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Abstract 
 
Nearly five years after signing the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that 
ended ten years of civil war in Nepal, key issues are still unresolved and political 
progress on implementation has been slow at its best. While every disarmament 
demobilization and reintegration (DDR) operation is unique, Nepal's DDR process has 
included atypical conditions such as no government support, continued military 
command over program participants, an unusually long time spent in cantonments prior 
to discharge, and the absence of an adequate pre-planning phase. This analysis is 
presented in the form of a case study and examines the United Nations Interagency 
Rehabilitation Program (UNIRP) response to these challenges using primary documents 
and interviews conducted with UN staff members in Nepal. The author argues that 
atypical challenges acted as drivers that resulted in programmatic innovations, including 
dynamic monitoring and evaluation, a centralized information system, and specific 
gender supports, that may be applicable to more traditional DDR operations, particularly 
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I INTRODUCTION AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) is increasingly recognized 
as a critical opportunity to contribute to the peace and stability of post conflict countries 
(Gamba 2006; Specker 2008; Muggah 2009; United Nations "IDDRS" 2010; Stankovie, 
Torjesen and Bleie 2010). As there is often a lack of national capacity in post-conflict 
environments, international organizations (IO) such as the United Nations (UN) have 
become increasingly involved in the oversight and implementation of DDR programs 
(Muggah 2009). Gender-sensitive programming and the importance of a "do no harm" 
approach are emphasized in recent DDR literature and are predominant in the 
International Disarmament Demobilization, and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS), 
published by the UN in 2010. Both concepts form cornerstones of the DDR operation 
currently in progress for Maoist ex-combatants in Nepal.1 This operation, referred to as 
rehabilitation in the Nepali context, is exceptional, due to the lack of government support, 
the length of time ex-combatants spent in cantonments, and the absence of an adequate 
pre-planning phase. Desmond Molloy, Senior Rehabilitation Advisor in Nepal, described 
this operation as, "especially complex and raising difficulties that I have not found 
anywhere else" (Molloy email correspondence with the author, April 13, 2011). 
                                                
1 Due to national sensitivities the term "rehabilitation" is used in Nepal rather than "DDR." 
With this in mind, the author most frequently uses the term "rehabilitation" when referring 
to the process unfolding in Nepal. However, there are times when this is confusing and 
because DDR theories, best practices and lessons learned are directly applicable, the 
author occasionally uses the term "DDR" to describe the ex-combatant rehabilitation. 
process in Nepal.  
2 
However, these challenges have made innovation imperative in the Nepali context. 
Innovative measures taken to ensure program adaptability and the participation of female 
ex-combatants will likely be appropriate for more traditional DDR operations as well. 
Nearly five years after signing the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that 
ended ten years of civil war2 in Nepal, key issues are still unresolved. Political progress 
on CPA implementation has been slow at best and often nonexistent. For example, a new 
constitution has yet to be finalized and more than 19,000 Maoist Army (MA) members 
remain cantoned3 in encampments around the country while the government debates the 
terms of their rehabilitation into society and integration into the Nepal Army (NA). This 
debate has been one of the most contentious issues of the peace process. From a 
humanitarian perspective, one of the most significant successes since the signing of the 
CPA was the discharge of 4,008 verified minors and late recruits (VMLRs) who fought 
with the People's Liberation Army (PLA)4 and were held with certified MA combatants 
for two and half years as the terms of their release were negotiated.  
The UN has played a limited but significant role supporting the peace process  
(Suhrke 2011; Tiwari 2009), and is administering the VMLR rehabilitation program 
through the specially created United Nations Interagency Rehabilitation Program 
(UNIRP). Proportionally, this is one of the largest female caseloads for the UN in any 
                                                
2 Technically, in order for a conflict to reach the intensity of war there must be 1,000 or 
more battle-related deaths within one year's time (Harbon and Wallensteen 2010, 501), 
meaning that some years of the conflict in Nepal do not qualify as war.  
3 A cantonment is a temporary or semi-permanent military or police headquarters (Oxford 
English Dictionary). There are a total of 21 Maoist cantonment sites in Nepal, each under 
the control of Maoist military commanders. The length of time spent in cantonments is 
significantly longer than the normal time, which is usually some months (Stankovie, Torjesen 
and Bleie 2010, 29). 
4 PLA is used when referring to the conflict period prior to the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement and Maoist Army is used when referring to the post-conflict period.  
3 
DDR operation. An agrarian revolution that denounced discrimination and championed 
gender equality, the Maoist cause had broad appeal for the women who form the 
backbone of Nepal's agricultural economy. They receive few benefits for their labor and 
are discriminated against by laws and traditions that restrict women from owning 
property (United Nations Country Team 2007, 37). Gender equality is a key component 
of the Maoist platform in Nepal and Maoist leadership has often referenced high levels of 
female participation, both to legitimize the movement and as a measure of their success 
(Yami 2007; Ariño 2008, Tamang 2009).  
The United Nations Mission to Nepal (UNMIN), responsible for the verification 
and registration process, found that women constituted 20 percent (3,846) of the PLA, 
although Maoists estimate 40 to 50 percent of combatants were women (Saferworld 
2010, 58).5 UNMIN disqualified 4,008 persons from serving as regular combatants with 
the MA, either because they were minors (2,973) or because they had violated the terms 
of the CPA by joining after it was signed (1,035), thus making them ineligible for 
consideration as Maoist army personnel. 30 percent of VMLRs are female. At this time 
only VMLRs are eligible to participate in the UNIRP rehabilitation program. UNIRP 
initially prioritized women and girls in its gender approach, noting that this population is 
doubly marginalized in Nepal—first for being women and second for fighting with the 
PLA.6 Conflict sensitive programming modeled after the "do no harm" approach was also 
                                                
5 The mandate of UNMIN lapsed in January 2010 amid controversy whether the 
departure is premature given the absence of the finalization of the constitution-making 
process.   
6 UNIRP is currently working to integrate a male gendered approach as well (UN staff 
member interview by the author June 20, 2011).  
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emphasized, as the post-conflict environment has remained troubled and uncertain 
(Suhrke 2011, 38).   
The Maoists were incorporated into the government, winning an overwhelming 
majority in the 2008 Constituent Assembly elections, shocking not only competing 
political parties and the international community, but also the Maoist party (Lawoti 
"Maoist Electoral Victory" 2010, 287).7 Intense tension and mistrust between Maoist and 
non-Maoist parties has culminated in the debate over how to handle the 19,602 cantoned 
MA combatants. This debate also delayed the VMLR discharge, despite the fact that 
cantoning them with regular combatants was a human rights violation. 
Political difficulties resulted in operational difficulties as UNIRP was forced to 
launch the rehabilitation program on short notice, with restricted access to VMLR 
socioeconomic data and under tight financial and time constraints. The heightened 
vulnerability of female VMLRs (FVMLRs) in Nepal compounded the challenges 
associated with developing an effective program.8 Anticipating that many programmatic 
elements would be added as participant data became available, the UN designed core 
programs on a basis of adaptability, facilitating adjustment as new needs are discovered. 
Several of the most successful components of this program were created and executed 
                                                
7 The Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (CPN-M) received two times more seats than their 
nearest rival and although the Maoists used violence and intimidation in some districts, 
they likely would have become the largest party even without these tactics (Lawoti "Maoist 
Electoral Victory" 2010, 301).   
8 UNIRP anticipated vulnerability associated with the traditional role of women in Nepali 
society where women are less educated than men, are denied access to economic 
opportunity, and whose health concerns are often neglected (United Nations Country Team 
Nepal "Common Country Assessment" 2007; Colekessian 2009; Tiwari 2009; United 
Nations Country Team Nepal "Development Assistance Framework 2007). However, they 
were not anticipating the vulnerability associated with a high number of inter-caste 
marriages, pregnant or lactating mothers, and women caring for small children. 
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during the implementation phase. This dynamic approach to DDR has particularly 
benefited FVMLRs.  
Why Nepal 
Every DDR process is unique and occurs in a distinctive environment. However, 
the VMLR rehabilitation process in Nepal is atypical in that there is no government 
support, there was no break in military command, VMLR’s spent an abnormally long 
duration of time cantoned before discharge, and the absence of a pre-transition planning 
phase that included VMLR needs assessment.  
This rehabilitation program is also significant to sustained peace within Nepal. 
Violent behavior learned during combat does not automatically disappear upon discharge 
and 80 percent of all current combatants indicated that they would be forced to return to 
violence either in criminal or political groups if not satisfied with their rehabilitation 
package (Saferworld 2010, xxiv).  
Women in Nepal experience high levels of discrimination and initial rehabilitation 
efforts indicate that those who were associated with the PLA are marginalized to an even 
greater extent. The UNIRP rehabilitation program has the potential to support Nepal's 
goals of achieving greater gender equality through their support of FVMLRs. 
Proportionally, this is one of the largest female caseloads ever handled in a UN DDR 
operation (UN staff member interview by the author June 29, 2011).9  
                                                
9 "We have developed a very strong and special gender perspective, noting that more 
than 30 percent of ex-combatants coming from the cantonment are women. This is indeed 
a very high number and would probably be the second highest number of any similar 
type of rehabilitation program in the world"(UNIRP press release March 7 2011).  
6 
Finally, several UNIRP program components, including dynamic monitoring and 
evaluation, the rehabilitation information system (RIS), and gender supports may be 
valuable in future DDR operations with a large female caseload. 
 
Methods 
The author chose to conduct a case study because of the benefits associated with 
this method when faced with relatively limited research sources (Lijphart 1971, 291). 
This method permitted an intensive examination of the rehabilitation process in Nepal, 
specifically for female ex-combatants, revealing variables not previously considered for 
DDR operations and generating the hypothesis that some UNIRP programmatic elements 
should be considered for future DDR processes.  
The focus on FVMLRs is appropriate because their rehabilitation process has the 
potential to further progress gender equality in Nepal, and also because it contributes to 
the current discussion concerning women and war in peacebuilding literature. Although a 
variety of organizations are involved in rehabilitation and reintegration efforts in Nepal, 
this case study focuses exclusively on UN programming because it is officially approved 
by the government and also because of the increasing role played by the UN in DDR 
processes around the world.  
Data was gathered through a review of primary documents and personal 
interviews conducted in Nepal and via email. Primary documents include the 
rehabilitation program's project proposal, concept notes, field reports, newsletters, and 
presentation outlines from a UNIRP training and evaluation workshop held in Nagarkot, 
Nepal, May 2011. Interviews were conducted with ten UN staff members including: 
7 
Robert Piper, Desmond Molloy and Isabella Leao. Robert Piper currently serves as the 
UNDP director in Nepal as well as the United Nations Resident and Humanitarian 
Coordinator, making him the top UN official in-country and the director of the UN 
country team. In addition to being a published DDR scholar, Desmond Molly is also the 
Senior Rehabilitation Advisor of the UN Country Team, Nepal. Isabella Leao, working 
with Folke Bernadotte Academy recently facilitated a workshop for UN staff regarding 
rehabilitation in the Nepali context.10 The remaining interviewees shall be kept 
confidential to protect the integrity of the program, currently in progress in a very 
sensitive environment  
The exceptional nature of the DDR process in Nepal; its potential impact on 
FVMLRs, female combatants, and the country at large; and its potential for replication in 
diverse international contexts, warrant close examination. The next section provides a 
contextual history that covers root causes of conflict in Nepal, conflict impact, and 
termination as well as initial peacebuilding phases. The third section places the case of 
Nepal in the context of current peacebuilding literature; while findings are reported in 
section four. The final section discusses the strengths and weaknesses of rehabilitation in 
Nepal and makes suggestions for future research. 
                                                
10 The Folke Bernadotte Academy (FBA) is a Swedish government agency dedicated to 
improving the quality and effectiveness of international conflict and crisis management, 
with a particular focus on peace operations. FBA hosted a workshop on the Nepali 









II NEPAL CONTEXT 
History 
Separating religion, caste, economic opportunity and politics has been impossible 
for the majority of Nepal’s history. Although there are more than 90 distinct languages 
spoken and a variety of ethnic and religious groups living in Nepal,11 Hindu culture as 
expressed by government elites has dominated and dictated the country's course. In the 
18th century Prithvi Narayan Shah unified three rival kingdoms, creating the country that 
is known today, and introduced the Hindu caste system to non-Hindu ethnic minorities.12 
The Rana dynasty overthrew the Shah dynasty in the mid 1800s, retained a nominal 
monarchy, and established an inherited prime minister-ship through which they 
controlled the actions of the king. Treating Nepal as their personal fiefdom, they formally 
codified the caste system and feudal style government in 1854. Peasants were required to 
pay a yearly tribute including half their agricultural gains and 70 days of unpaid work; 
society was governed by a complex set of religious rules guiding inter-caste interaction, 
including commensality, sexual relations, marriage, entry into rooms, and both food and 
                                                
11 The United Nations Country Team reports that Nepal is home to more than 60 ethnic 
groups speaking 92 distinct languages. Religion plays an important role in the country with 
81 percent of the population identifying as Hindu, 11 percent as Buddhist, 4.2 percent 
Muslim and the remainder as Kirats, Sikhs, Jains and Christians. Socioeconomic status is 
significantly related to both ethnicity and religion (United Nations Country Team 2007). 
12 A detailed discussion of the caste system is beyond the scope of this work, but those 
interested in learning more about the effect of the caste system on women and the ways in 
which ritual purity equated to power in Nepal should consult On the Edge of the 
Auspicious: Gender and Caste in Nepal by Mary M. Cameron (1998). 
 
9 
nonfood transactions (Cameron 1998, 12). Legislation blurred the line between structure 
and culture and although some of these laws have been modified, many continue to 
discriminate against women (United Nations Country Team Nepal "Common Country 
Assessment" 2007, 37). 
As Nepal opened its doors to the outside world, Nepalis were exposed to alternate 
systems of government and became dissatisfied with Nepal's standard of living (Marks 
and Palmer 2005, 94). Responding to demands for change, King Mahendra launched 
Nepal's first experiment with democracy in 1951. Concerned with power and control 
rather than democracy, the king drafted a constitution that granted him executive, 
legislative, and judicial powers as the sovereign ruler of Nepal. He continued to exercise 
authority through previously established political and military bureaucracies, later 
banning political parties in favor of a partyless system known as the panchayat.13 This 
system created political institutions that operated in silos, preventing citizens from 
uniting across district lines. Although this was initially beneficial for maintaining 
dominance, the Maoists exploited this as a weakness during the conflict when the 
government was unable to communicate across previous established lines of 
communication. The infrastructure to mount an effective counterinsurgency did not exist. 
                                                
13 The panchayat system was a three-tiered political structure. The first tier was composed 
of representatives elected directly by the local population. This group sent representatives 
to serve in a zonal or regional tier. Members of the national tier were selected from 
village and regional tiers, professional organizations and class-based unions using a 
complex voting system. The structure gave the appearance of political representation 
while reinforcing feudal traditions through a patron-client network in which only 
bureaucrats enjoyed true political power. Representation remained virtually unchanged 
and average citizens, especially in rural regions remained politically voiceless. 
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In 1990, violent protesters fought for democracy and the monarchy again resisted 
change, creating a quasi-monarchical democracy and retaining emergency powers and 
military control. Rhetorically the new constitution embraced multiculturalism, but the 
representation of many marginalized groups actually declined between 1990-2002 
(Kantha 2010, 159).  
In 1995, one year before conflict broke out, John Metz published the article, 
"Development in Nepal: Investment in the Status Quo," addressing Nepal's continued 
underdevelopment despite having received billions of dollars in aid. Highlighting areas 
that have since been described as causal factors in conflict outbreak, he points to the 
extractive state and poor infrastructure as development inhibitors. Rather than effectively 
using aid monies, the feudal elite directed and diverted aid flows to consolidate their 
power and infrastructure development ignoring the needs of 90 percent of the country, 
most of which was devoted to subsistence farming (175-184). Ironically, the years spent 
consolidating power and neglecting infrastructure development in rural regions later 
hampered the government's ability to respond to the Maoist insurgency.   
 
Political, Economic and Social Complaints  
The Nepali state has traditionally prevented true political participation, neglected 
to facilitate economic development, and actively imposed a repressive social regime. 
Whether in the feudal systems of the Shah and Rana dynasties or the "democracies" that 
followed, political representation was not priority for governing elites who also restricted 
access to economic assets. Land ownership rights and economic access were based on 
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caste, and the government's attempt to grant land ownership rights to peasants actually 
consolidated the power and position of high caste members14 (Joshi 2010, 95). Income 
inequality was drastic at conflict outset. For example, income in the Rolpa district was 
only 25 percent that of Kathmandu (Murshed and Gates 2005, 125).15 High levels of 
unemployment, particularly in relation to urban centers in the mid-western districts are 
credited with easing recruitment for the Maoists. Neither Rukum nor Rolpa had benefited 
from economic growth and development in Nepal (Murshed and Gates 2005), perhaps 
lowering the economic threshold to take up violence as a means of enacting change 
(Mancour 2009, 9). 
 Socially, Hindu cultural norms provided a framework for the ideal citizen.16 The 
likelihood of falling below the poverty line and having fewer livelihood resources and 
opportunities increases for women, members of indigenous ethnic groups, those with a 
low caste ranking, and devotees of a religion other than Hinduism (United Nations 
Country Team Nepal "Common Country Assessment" 2007, 53). The cultural and 
linguistic hegemony imposed by elites is significant because it both justified and 
provided a foundation for discrimination in Nepal and has been described as both a 
                                                
14 The Tenancy Rights Acquisition Act of 1951 was intended to break down the feudal 
system by providing land titles to peasants paying taxes or rent on land they cultivated.  
However, because landlords routinely reported the taxes they collected in their own name 
instead of the tenants who paid them, landlords were able to claim a permanent legal 
title to lands they had previously managed in trust for the state.   
15 Additionally, high unemployment compelled many citizens from rural areas to migrate 
to Kathmandu or abroad in search of livelihood opportunities with 23.4% of households 
receiving remittances in 1996 (Kollmair et al 2006, 157).  
16 As evidenced in a speech in which King Mahendra defined the notion of equality among 
citizens into Hindu terms saying that, “all the devotees of Vishnu [have] an identical 
substance that unites them within the subtle body of Vishnu,” in the way that all in Nepal 
are ‘one and the same’ in their devotion to the state (de Sales 2000, 43).  
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consequence and a cause of conflict (Lawoti "Evolution and growth of the Maoist 
insurgency" 2010, 11). One of the more contentious elements of cultural imperialism has 
been the state’s emphasis on Nepali as a national language (Riaz and Basu 2007, 128) 
that fails to recognize the 92 distinct languages spoken in Nepal and prevents non-Nepali 
speakers from accessing state, legal, or educational resources.   
 
The Maoist Alternative 
Assisted by Indian communists, the Communist Party of Nepal (CPN) was 
established in Calcutta in 1949. The communist movement spread clandestinely as the 
Nepali government was quick to silence voices of dissent. The movement fractured 
frequently due to disagreements over policy and personality conflicts. Influenced by the 
violent Naxalite Maoist movement in West Bengal, Nepali communists launched their 
first violent movement in 1971 killing several “class enemies” in eastern Nepal. Adopting 
both political and market compromises, the movement had grown considerably by the 
1990s.  
One of the communist coalitions won nine seats in the 1991 elections, two of 
them in the neighboring districts of Rukum and Rolpa. Despite the fact that the Nepal 
Congress Party won the majority of seats in parliament, they were concerned about 
growing support for communism-especially in Rukum and Rolpa as they had a history of 
communist interest. The Congress Party fabricated accusations against Communist 
leaders in the two districts deploying the police who burned houses, looted cash and 
goods, raped women and arrested hundreds of people. This event has later been described 
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as the conflict flashpoint as the conflict broke out in Rolpa shortly thereafter (Cottle and 
Keys 2007, 170).  
Prachanda17 launched CPN-M and sustained the insurgency against the 
government of Nepal. His extension of Marxism-Lenninism-Maoism takes specific 
account of the Nepali experience and is known as the Prachanda Path. Because Maoist 
ideology centers on liberating the oppressed from the oppressor, it has broad appeal for 
marginalized groups in Nepal, including women. Maoist activists exploited widespread 
disappointment with the government by offering what they described as efficient and 
representative alternatives (Eck 2010, 38). Although they didn’t hesitate to use terror and 
authoritarian tactics when it suited their purposes, Maoists improved political 
participation in many of the districts they controlled. For example, the seventeen-member 
committee of the people's government in Dolakha included at least one representative 
from every ethnic group living in the district (Schneiderman and Turin 2004, 80). 
The Maoists vehemently opposed the class, gender, linguistic, religious, and 
ethnic oppression associated with Hindu chauvinism as outlined by their 40-point 
demand issued in February of 1996.18 Prachanda declared that the participation of women 
who had suffered under the double oppression of gender and class was one of the main 
factors behind the success of the movement (Yami 2006, 2). Components of the Maoist 
ideological platform devoted to agricultural reform are particularly pertinent for women 
in Nepal because most are involved in agricultural work, but legally prevented from 
owning or inheriting land (Yami 2006, 12). 
                                                
17 Puspa Kamal Dahal is his given name, but he is better known as Prachanda.  
18 Please see Appendix C to read these demands. 
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 Hisila Yami, a prominent member of the party since 1996, identified the 
economic, social and political arenas as the three main categories of female oppression. 
Land ownership is often a precondition for banking transactions, further limiting the 
economic opportunities of women. Socially, the value of a woman is defined by her 
relationships with men: they are born as daughters for whom a dowry must be provided, 
become wives beholden to their husbands, and die mothers who find honor in the number 
of sons they bore. These social norms bleed into laws, which reinforce social 
discrimination and institutionalize political discrimination.  
 
 PLA  
Challenging the traditional image of women, the PLA has been a powerful agent 
of change within Nepali communities.19 Although precise numbers are still not available 
it is estimated that between 20 and 40 percent of the Maoist army was female, with, 70 
percent of these women coming from traditionally excluded Tibeto-Burman ethnic 
communities.20 Although women in Nepal have a rich fighting tradition, it was the first 
time that they were given a formal role, exchanging sickles and sticks for guns and 
                                                
19 It should be noted that while beyond the scope of this paper, changes in gender roles 
did occur at the village level as well. Some women helped provide food, shelter, and 
supplies for Maoist insurgents. In some areas, virtually all men remain disappeared 
because they joined the Maoist army, fled to avoid recruitment or were killed. Women 
were forced to step into roles traditionally reserved for men. For example, although it was 
religiously forbidden for women to plow the fields and not culturally permitted for women 
to thatch roofs, women began to complete these and other traditionally male roles out of 
necessity. Some women are eager to preserve these higher levels of leadership and 
decision-making power.  
20 Twenty percent of the cantoned forces registered by UNMIN are women and 30 
percent of the minors who fought with the PLA are female. Maoists continue to insist that 
40-50 percent of the PLA was composed of women. These figures do not account for 
women associated with the PLA in support roles.  
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formal command. Looking to the experience of the Shining Path in Peru, Maoists viewed 
female participation in the insurgency as a way to legitimize the movement (Scott and 
Palmer 2005; Yami 2005; Bouta, Bannon and Frerks 2005). Women were assimilated 
into a typical hierarchical military structure, in which they were promoted and attained a 
variety of military positions. It is rare to find women in the upper echelons of party 
leadership, but women have been promoted to commanding positions within the army 
with a few units entirely female.21 Each guerilla squad consisted of nine to 12 members 
and had a policy of recruiting at least two female guerillas. The PLA offered basic 
education alongside military training and for many women, this was their first and only 
opportunity to learn how to read and write. 
Although there are reports of men being forced to join as combatants, it seems 
that most women joined the military of their own volition, commonly citing autonomy 
and a desire to fight on the side of justice as principal motivations. Additionally, several 
women indicated that they joined in order to protect themselves from sexual abuse and 
rape committed by state security agencies. Every female combatant interviewed by 
Saferworld in 2010 stated that they felt more empowered as a woman, physically and 
politically, after joining the Maoist PLA and that the training they received meant that 
they were politically astute and able to defend themselves (Saferworld 2010, 6-7).22 
Although the PLA does not have a perfect record and there are reports of gender 
inequality and insensitivity, current combatants believe that the Maoist Army treats 
                                                
21 These entirely female squads are actually famous for their vicious fighting skills and 
have a reputation for operating without mercy.  
22 One hundred thirty-six female combatants were interviewed for the report.   
 
16 




The Maoist regime tackled common societal issues and may have had a positive 
impact on the lives of women (Lawoti and Pahari 2010). Gambling, alcoholism, and 
domestic violence are significant problems in rural Nepal, intensifying women's burdens. 
The Maoists often prohibited the public sale of liquor, punished men engaged in domestic 
violence, enforced monogamous relationships, and introduced ideas that began to erode 
notions of sexism, ethnic prejudice, and discrimination (CARE 2010, 4). Rates of crimes 
involving female victims, including rape, trafficking, and domestic violence, declined as 
the insurgency spread. Women mobilized into supportive village and district-level 
organizations and in districts where people’s courts were established, cases against 
women’s exploitation were successfully brought to book. 
 
Peace Negotiations 
The trajectory of conflict termination can be viewed as a series of phases 
punctuated by turning points in the conflict. Turning points in Nepal were associated with 
shifts in the balance of power between the monarchy, Maoists, and Parliament.23 While 
the Monarchy was eager to protect and preserve the status quo, the Maoists pursued 
dramatic change. Members of parliament were ideologically divided and it was not until 
                                                
23 Power struggles and infighting are common in Nepali politics as elites shift their goals 
and strategies to advance their own interests and of course each conflict actor sought 
greater power with which to advance their political agenda. 
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the primary goal of the government and the primary goal of the Maoists converged that 
peace talks gained a lasting momentum. 
Two major turning points in the conflict and negotiation process are associated 
with King Gyanendra’s moves to demonstrate authority and consolidate power. The first 
occurred when he deployed the RNA in 2001 departing from a previous strategy that only 
permitted the police force to respond to Maoist attacks. Secondly, Gyanendra dismissed 
Parliament and placed key party leaders under house arrest in 2005. This resulted in the 
formation of the Seven Party Alliance (SPA) as government officials fought to restore 
Parliament.24 They worked with the CPN-M to remove the king from power and 
negotiated the CPA, initiating a process that eventually cost Gyanendra his throne. 
Mismanagement of the conflict on the part of the state played into the attempt of political 
entrepreneurs to overthrow the monarchy (Palmer and Scott 2005).  
Working together, the alliance directed all its energy against Gyanendra. They 
fought to gain official state recognition, announcing a 21-day protest in Kathmandu in 
April 2006.25 Desperate to preserve power, Gyanendra announced that he would return 
power to the people, calling for elections to be held as soon as possible. The restoration 
of Parliament paved the way for further negotiations between the SPA and CPN-M, but 
                                                
24 Parliament was split in terms of goals for most of the Maoist insurgency with some 
leaning towards Communism and others supporting the monarchy. Royalists supported the 
monarchy and acted to prevent change. Those that supported change varied in terms of 
ideology and the degree to which they agreed with the CPN-M platform. Some 
representatives, particularly independent leftist Padma Ratna Tuladhar acted as links 
between the Maoists and other conflict actors, facilitating negotiations throughout the 
conflict.  
25 Gyanendra responded by proclaiming a citywide curfew and ordering the RNA to 
shoot protestors on sight. On April 21 between 300,000 and 500,000 citizens took part in 
the protests and RNA commanders informed Gyanendra that soldiers were unwilling to 
continue firing upon Nepali citizens.   
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the parties were unable to move forward due to serious disagreements concerning arms 
and armed personnel management. It was at this point that they turned to the UN for 
formal assistance in the peace process. The pre-assessment mission quickly deployed and 
recommended the appointment of a senior UN political interlocutor, supported by a small 
team of advisors in Nepal. Shortly thereafter the SPA and the CPN-M sent separate but 
identically worded letters to the Secretary-General formally requesting UN assistance. 
Ian Martin was appointed as the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) 
in Nepal. On November 21, 2006, the SPA and the CPN-M signed the CPA, officially 
ending the war. 
 
The CPA and Path Dependencies 
Patterns established during peace negotiations set the stage for the post-conflict 
peacebuilding process in Nepal. Difficulty in determining a plan for DDR, a tendency for 
all parties to cheat, and tension over the role of the UN were key issues during 
negotiations and have carried over into current peacebuilding efforts. Mutual distrust 
necessitated a vague agreement that left central issues to be resolved through future 
processes. The conflict ended in a mutually hurting stalemate leading both Maoist and 
non-Maoist parties to declare victory in Nepal. The vague nature of the CPA allowed 
each to claim that it fulfilled their primary objectives. All parties are therefore reluctant to 
compromise on current points of contention regarding CPA implementation.  
The CPA outlined the cantonment process but did not address integration and 
timing. The CPA stipulated that an elected constitutional assembly would promulgate a 
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constitution based on the restructuring of the state along federal lines but there was no 
agreement as to the criteria that constitutes federalism. The CPA affirmed the principle of 
land reform and that those responsible for gross human rights violations during the war 
would be held accountable, but did not specify the process of implementation.26 The CPA 
seems to have set the stage for what has been termed conflictual peacebuilding (Suhrke 
2011, 38-39) as violence continues to threaten the peacebuilding process. The relatively 
limited role of the international community set a pattern for external involvement in the 
post-conflict phase as well, in that all parties have been clear that the peace process 
belongs to Nepal rather than the international community.27  
Five and a half years after signing the CPA, political parties are still debating its 
terms rather than focusing on the needs of the Nepali people. Central to the debate is the 
issue of integrating certified MA combatants into the NA.28 Parties do not agree on the 
number that should be integrated or if the process should occur before or after the 
promulgation of a new constitution.29 
                                                
26 Amnesty International reports that as of February 2011, not one prosecution was 
brought to bear on conflict-related crimes including extrajudicial killings, disappeared 
persons, torture, and other human rights violations perpetrated by the army, police, and 
Maoist forces (Amnesty International 2011). 
27 Although the CPA restricted international involvement in some arenas it also contains 
milestones that require external financing indicating that there was no intention to cut off 
aid supplies which accounted for more than one quarter of annual public expenditure in 
2010 (Australian Government Aid Program et al). 
28 While extremists on both sides had argued either for total integration or no integration 
the current situation in the country indicates that Maoist and non-Maoist parties are 
working toward a compromise, integrating between 6-8,000 MA members into the NA. 
Although there has been a great deal of discussion, there is no official position as to the 
fate of the remaining 11-13,000 cantoned combatants or whether they will receive a 
rehabilitation package or not.  
29 There is also a debate as to whether or not integration should occur at all. 
 
20 
Political parties, consumed with the tensions that divide them, have devoted all of 
their energy towards issues related to the immediate peace process at the expense of 
longer-term concerns (Australian Government Aid Program et al 2011, xii). In her final 
briefing to the Security Council as the head of UNMIN, Karin Landgren reported that the 
peace process was deadlocked with little progress on critical issues, and that parties had 
experienced difficulty in maintaining consensus or negotiating power-sharing 
arrangements. Referencing those in Nepal who deride the peace process as unproductive 
and too slow she noted, "there is a real risk that the failure of the peace process will 
become a self-fulfilling prophecy" (Landgren 2011, 3). 
Non-Maoist parties argue that they cannot move forward with the Constitution 
process until the MA issue is resolved because it is unfair to try to deal politically with an 
armed party. The Maoists on the other hand have never officially renounced violence as a 
party strategy and are reluctant to lose leverage, arguing that they cannot abandon control 
of their army until they are guaranteed that their concerns are appropriately addressed in 
the new Constitution. Meanwhile, infrastructural and domestic concerns unrelated to the 
CPA's terms are virtually ignored. Political instability weakens the country's ability to 
implement economic reform or create a stable environment for development.30 The 
longer the political transition stretches on, the harder life gets for the average Nepali 
citizen.  
                                                
30 Nepal now has the lowest GDP per capita in South Asia (United Nations Country Team 






III CONCEPTUAL ORIENTATION 
Addressing the root causes of war and the combatants' motivation to mobilize is 
critical to the success of any DDR program (Steward 2008, Muggah 2010; Stankovie, 
Torjesen and Bleie 2010). Scholars have pointed to religion, ethnicity, economics, 
poverty, geography, social groups, individuals, and various combinations thereof to 
explain war. The linkages between root cause analyses and programmatic interventions 
determine a program's focus, strategy, and priorities and is critical for the "do no harm" 
approach that requires careful contextual analysis in an effort to avoid actions that 
unintentionally exacerbate tension and causes for conflict.  
 
Root Causes of War 
Many of causal analyses of the conflict in Nepal mirror the "greed versus 
grievance" debate sparked in 1998. Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler set the tone for a 
decade of discussion when they published a paper arguing that conflict is caused by, 
"opportunities for primary commodity predation," and that, "objective grievance is not a 
powerful primary cause of conflict" (Collier and Hoeffler 1998). Critics protested that 
history, politics, and social conditions cannot be ignored, thus igniting the greed versus 
grievance debate. Specifically related to Nepal, Murshed and Gates (2005) emphasize 
grievances associated with ethnicity, pointing to intergroup inequality, poverty, and 
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human rights abuses.31 Acharya (2010), on the other hand, denies a causal link between 
the Maoist insurgency and grievances, social factors, or ideology, arguing that economic 
incentives were of primary importance.32  
Combatants fight for a variety of reasons that change over time, (Stankovie, 
Torjesen and Bleie 2010, 43) and the scope of both the greed and the grievance approach 
are too narrow to explain Nepal's recent conflict. A framework presented by William 
Zartman (2005, 256-284) is a better fit, addressing a variety of important factors by using 
the intersection of need, creed, and greed to elucidate root causes of war. According to 
Zartman, state weakness and neglect in conjunction with rising expectations and unmet 
need sets the stage for conflict. Political entrepreneurs capitalize on this situation, 
promising an alternative to an ineffectual government and creating a fighting identity that 
is based on ideology. In the final phase of the conflict cycle, the focus may shift from the 
provision of group benefits to the seizure of individual benefits. Need is transformed into 
creed which then shifts to greed.  
 
State Weakness and Neglect 
In Nepal, neglect and weakness stemmed from both a lack of concern and a lack 
of capacity. As an extractive state, Nepal has failed to invest in infrastructure or 
                                                
31 Wennmann (2009) refers to socio-economic inequality as a major catalyst for conflict 
while Hatlebakk (2009) finds that income poverty and land inequality are main 
determinants of Maoist influence. 
32 Do and Iyer (2007) find that ethnic and caste polarization, land inequality, and 
political participation are not significantly associated with violence (1).  
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development, particularly in rural areas.33 When the Maoist insurgency began, Nepal's 
government was unable to respond quickly or efficiently due at least in part to the dearth 
of infrastructure including roads and electricity.34 Partial democracies are also highly 
vulnerable to conflict (US Agency for International Development 2004, 15) thus 
contributing to Nepal's fragility.  
 
Unmet Needs and Rising Expectations  
   The need component of Zartman's model is complemented by Francis Stewart's 
work on horizontal inequalities. Horizontal inequalities are inequalities in economic, 
social, political dimensions, or cultural status between culturally defined groups (Stewart 
2008, 3). Stewart explores five categories of horizontal inequality: political participation, 
economic assets, income, employment, and societal aspects. In Nepal, each of these 
categories is intricately intertwined with the others and tied to the Hindu caste system as 
interpreted by governmental elites. Women consistently bear the brunt of inequality in 
each category. Although horizontal inequalities were a normal feature throughout Nepal's 
history, expectations began to rise in the mid-twentieth century as Nepali citizens were 
exposed to forms of government in other countries (Scott and Palmer 2005, 94).  
 
                                                
33 For a more complete analysis of the history and effect of development of the extractive 
state in Nepal, please see "Development in Nepal—Investment in the Status Quo" by John 
Metz (1995). 
34 Even today, the only possible form of motorized transport to the district of Rukum, one 




Political Entrepreneurs  
The role of political entrepreneurs in initiating conflict is widely acknowledged 
(Palmer and Scott 2005; Arnson 2005, 10; Zartman 2005; Stewart 2008; Acharya 2010). 
Zartman emphasizes political entrepreneurs as catalysts who transform need into creed. 
The Maoists used ideology to solve the problem of collective action, mobilizing groups to 
fight one another (Murshed and Gates 2005) and providing a powerful sustaining force 
for the conflict. Economic need and grievances provided the conflict's launching point, 
but for many combatants, ideology eventually superseded other motivations.35  
 
Greed 
Access to resources was a major problem for the CPN-M because its base areas 
were among the poorest regions in the country. As a result, the CPN-M was forced to rely 
on criminal activity including bank robbing, kidnapping-for-ransom, and extortion, to 
generate funds. Although these activities were occasionally quite profitable, they were 
not sufficient to meet the demands of rapid expansion (Marks and Palmer 2005, 103) and 
the conflict failed to evolve into one revolving around greed. This is likely due to Nepal's 
lack of capturable resources. However, while looting material resources has not played a 
significant role, the pattern in which group benefits are traded for the acquisition of 
individual gain has occurred in terms of power. Political culture in Nepal is based on the 
theory, "might makes right," (Stankovie, Torjesen and Bleie 2010, 12) and in many ways 
                                                
35 Ideology helps answer Acharya's (2010, 280) challenge to the idea that grievance was 
important. He argues that if grievance really were a casual factor, than revolutionary 
leaders would have sprung up in some of the more downtrodden regions of Nepal. 
However, while objective conditions may support perception they are secondary to the 
subjective sense of deprivation (Zartman 2005, 267).  
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former and current combatants are little more than bargaining chips in a power struggle 
between political parties (Isabella Leao, interview with the author June 27, 2011). 
 
DDR 
The concept of disarmament demobilization and reintegration (DDR) as a formal 
process developed as the Cold War thawed and states started exploring the collective 
management of conflict resolution (Gamba 2006, 53). Maoists protest the use of the term 
DDR, as they did not experience a military defeat. DDR is absent in more ways than 
name in Nepal. Maoist combatants have been disarmed, but the process has stalled at that 
point. VMLRs were finally discharged after protracted negotiations and given the option 
to participate in a voluntary rehabilitation program based on the IDDRS.   
First published by the UN in 2006, the IDDRS bring together knowledge, lessons, 
and good practice. According to the IDDRS, the primary objective of DDR is to 
contribute to security and stability in post-conflictive environments thus enabling 
recovery and development (United Nations "IDDRS" 2010, 53). Early DDR operations 
focused on reducing the number of uniformed soldiers, weapons, and defense 
expenditures assuming that the physical removal of weapons and disbanding of armed 
groups would automatically result in loyalty for the government on the part of 
combatants (Muggah 2009, 123). Recognizing the simplistic nature of this approach, 
efforts that focus on individual combatants and technical procedures have been replaced 
by strategies that take a longer-term view, focusing on development and seeking to 
involve the community at large as well as combatants (Annan and Patel 2009, 9). The 
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goal of second generation DDR is to place weapons beyond use in the context of 
improving human security36 through social and economic investment (Gamba 2006; 
Annan and Patel 2009; Molloy 2009; Muggah 2009). 
 Disarmament refers to the collection, documentation, control, and disposal of 
arms and ammunition, including the development of responsible arms management 
programs. Demobilization is the formal and controlled discharge of active combatants 
from armed forces or other armed groups. The R-phase of DDR is conceptualized in a 
number of ways, making a clear working definition key for successful implementation 
and evaluation (Specker 2008). The UN distinguishes between reinsertion and 
reintegration, defining reinsertion as short-term transitional assistance offered to ex-
combatants during demobilization but prior to reintegration, which is a long-term process 
(United Nations "IDDRS" 2010, 25). Transitional assistance may include food, clothes, 
shelter, medical services, short-term education, training, and employment tools. 
Reintegration is a long-term social and economic process by which ex-combatants 
acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income. Because the 
community plays an integral role in the reintegration of ex-combatants, an approach that 
focuses on both the community and individual combatants mitigates risk and capitalizes 
on opportunity (Stankovie, Torjesen and Bleie 2010, 47). This focus helps prevent 
problems stemming from the perception that combatants are being rewarded for the use 
of violence—a current tension in Nepal. Also germane to Nepal is the realization that 
some communities will not or cannot economically absorb ex-combatants (Molloy 2009; 
                                                
36 The concept of human security shifts the focus from state to individual security, 
frequently defined as "freedom from fear" and the removal of force and violence from 
people's everyday lives (Krause 2009, 150). 
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United Nations "IDDRS" 2010, United Nations Country Team Nepal "Development 
Assistance Framework" 2009). Ex-combatants in Nepal have faced difficulty in obtaining 
employment both because of generally high levels of unemployment and discrimination 
associated with fighting in the PLA.  
Increasing numbers of female combatants in conflicts around the world37 have 
drawn attention to the need for DDR programming that addresses specific gendered 
needs.38 Women are associated with armed groups in three primary ways: as regular 
active combatants, in supportive roles, or as dependents of a combatant (United Nations 
"IDDRS" 2010, 194). Twenty percent of the Maoist combatants registered by UNMIN 
are women and thirty percent of the VMLRs are female. Some women chose to fight with 
the PLA while others were forced. The UN has also identified a significant number of 
female dependents (Robert Piper, interview by author June 22, 2011; "Women's 
Participation in Peacebuilding; Report of the Secretary General" 2010).  
The particular challenges associated with meeting the needs of female participants 
in DDR programs are confirmed by the Nepali experience. Because female dependents 
and support staff may not be listed on official registers additional effort is required to 
communicate with them and explain the benefits for which they are eligible. Fearful of 
repercussions, commanders of armed forces may deliberately prevent females who were 
forced to join the fighting force or who experience sexual and gender based violence 
                                                
37 Estimates indicate that 10-30 percent of armies and guerilla groups are comprised of 
women (Bouta, Frerks and Bannon 2005, 9).   
38 Gender in this context is sometimes mistakenly equated to women when it actually 
indicates the need for a focus that addresses the different needs of both men and women. 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to address the gender specific needs of both men and 
women in post-conflict Nepal. For a discussion that addresses needs of men as well please 
see the 2010 Saferworld report.  
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(SGBV) from accessing DDR programs. Females also hesitate to come forward because 
of the stigma associated with living and fighting among male combatants. Because 
women often experience greater levels of SBGV during conflict, their psychosocial needs 
are unique and may be more intensive than those of men (Bouta, Frerks and Bannon 
2005, 16). Women and girls frequently join armed groups as a means by which to flee 
oppression and obtain gender equality and are not eager to return to communities that 
expect them to submit to a more traditional role (Colekessian 2009, 6). These challenges 
resulted in a push for gender mainstreaming39 within DDR operations, not only as a 
normative requirement but also as a sustainability measure. The IDDRS also emphasizes 
a conflict sensitive approach based on the "do no harm" principal, meaning that careful 
attention and consideration should be paid to local context dynamics, as well as the 
possible ramifications of each action to avoid unintentionally exacerbating conflict 
dynamics (United Nations "IDDRS" 2010, 204). 
 
Domestic-International Interactions 
As with any domestic-international interaction, the relationship between the 
international community and domestic events and actors is complex with the actions of 
both affecting the actions of the other. Doyle and Sambanis (2006) argue that 
international organizations can substitute for local capacity and Gamba (2006) declares 
that the constructive involvement of a regional umbrella of concerned states contributing 
to the implementation of peace exponentially increase the chances of success for a DDR 
                                                
39 Gender mainstreaming is the process of assessing the implications for women and men 




operation. However, the importance of local ownership has also been increasingly 
emphasized (Muggah 2009, 174). It is increasingly common for DDR to be overseen by 
international organizations that must balance the need for a quick and efficient DDR 
process with the need for national ownership, something that requires capacity, time, and 
energy. This balance does not exist in Nepal, where Maoist and non-Maoist parties alike 
are opposed to the rehabilitation program even though the majority of its eligible 
participants joined the PLA as minors.  
The political situation in Nepal made it difficult for the UNIRP to supplement 
local capacity, as the government is divided and often hamstrung. This experience seems 
to confirm the doubt that international assistance can compensate for local capacity in 
Nepal (Suhrke 2010, 37). For example, Stankovie, Torjesen and Bleie (2010) argue that, 
"DDR is effective—or not effective—not so much due to the organization and character 
of a given DDR program, but due to a host of macro- and micro- factors in specific 
country contexts" (9). 
 The relatively limited role of international actors in Nepal's peace negotiations 
set a pattern for external involvement after the war as well. Nepali politicians have 
fiercely defended their right to address Nepal's problems in their own manner. Nepal 
views itself as a provider of peacekeepers, not a receiver, and therefore established a 
minimal role for the United Nations Mission to Nepal during peace negotiations. This has 
carried over into the post-conflict phase as well. Comparative politics and international 
relations scholars have investigated how the global system empowers and constrains 
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domestic interest groups (Drezner 2003, 2), but there is little precedent to explain 










Because the fate of the 19,602 certified combatants has yet to be determined, the 
current rehabilitation process in Nepal includes only the 4,008 individuals that UNMIN 
disqualified from serving in the MA, either because they were minors or because they 
joined after the signing of the CPA. Of this number, small in relation to many other DDR 
caseloads, 30 percent are female and 75 percent were minors at the time of certification. 
All parties agreed to the term "disqualified," but once translated it carried a negative 
connotation, prompting the UN to use the term verified minor and late recruit (VMLR) 
instead (Piper interview with Mikel Dunham, April 2011). Due to the post-conflict 
political situation, VMLRs were not immediately released, living in cantonments for 
more than two years during a protracted negotiation process that finally culminated in 
their discharge in early 2010.  
 
Maoist Cantonments 
VMLRs were cantoned with regular combatants for two and a half years. The 
Agreement on the Monitoring of the Management of Arms and Armies (AMMAA) was 
signed November 28, 2006; one week after the CPA was signed. It stated that the parties 
agreed to seek UN assistance in monitoring management of the arms and armies of both 
sides and outlined a process by which the Maoist army would be cantoned and its 
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weapons stored in a manner that preserved the normal MA chain of command, including 
control of communication and information.40 There are seven main cantonment sites, 
each with three satellite sites (AMMAA).  
Table 1 
Location and Size of Primary Cantonment Sites 
Division Location (city, district) Number of Cantoned 
Combatants 
First Division Chulachi, Ilam  1933 
Second Division Dhudhauli, Sindhuli  1632 
Third Division Shaktikhor, Chitwan  3951 
Fourth Division Jhyaltungdada, Nawalparasi  3077 
Fifth Division Dahaban, Rolpa 2442 
Sixth Division Dasarathpur, Surkhet  3100 
Seventh Division Talbandi, Kailali 3327 
Source: "The People's Liberation Army" by Ameet Dhakal in The Nepali Security Sector (2009) 
 
Introduction to UNIRP 
UNIRP is a new interagency project that seeks to build on existing projects and 
experience, utilizing the expertise of several UN agencies while enhancing coordination 
and strategic coherence. Staff members were pulled from the UNDP, UNICEF, UNFPA 
and ILO and focus on program areas in which their agency has relevant experience. 
Policy direction to UNIRP is provided by a steering committee that includes the heads of 
the relevant agencies, UNFPA, ILO, UNICEF, and UNDP, chaired by the Resident 
Coordinator. The joint initiative builds on existing United Nations Peace Fund for Nepal 
(UNPFN)-funded projects related to discharge and rehabilitation that are currently being 
implemented by UNDP, UNICEF and UNFPA. UNIRP is halfway through a two-year 
mandate. VMLRs who contact UNIRP and register for the program participate in a career 
                                                
40 An equal number of NA members are confined to barracks and an equal number of NA 
arms registered and stored in locked, monitored storage facilities.  
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counseling session to help them decide which package best fits their needs.41 Five 
regional offices are responsible for monitoring and evaluation, administration and issuing 
daily reports to UNIRP headquarters in Kathmandu. The following table shows pre-
existing programs and the areas of responsibility for each implementing agency.  
Table 2 
Agency Contributions 
Organization UNIRP Mandate Pre-existing Program 





Discharge and Reintegration Assistance to 
the Maoist Army  
UNICEF Manages education 
and psycho-social 
counseling program 
Program of Support for Children and 
Adolescents Formerly Associated with the 
Maoist Army in Nepal  
UNFPA Provides gender and 
health support  
Support to Female Members of the Maoist 
Army, among the 4,008 to be discharged, 
in the divisions and host communities 
during the discharge and peace-building 
process 





Source: UNDP factsheet, "Assistance to the Peace Process" (2010)  
 
UNIRP Objective 
 The primary objective of UNIRP is to have as many possible minors and late 
recruits involved in gainful employment or livelihood opportunities by supporting their 
rehabilitation. Additionally, UNIRP seeks to address possible feelings of hostility and 
fear toward discharges from the general public through a public information and 
                                                
41 The deadline to register for the rehabilitation program passed in April of 2011and 




sensitization campaign that promotes understanding, acceptance, and reconciliation as the 
dischargees re-enter civilian life.  
Table 3 
UNIRP Program Summary 
Duration: June 2010-May 2012 
Budget: $14.5m 
Funded/Unfunded budget: $8.2m (57%)/$6.3m (43%) 
Location: Communities of Resettlement 
Implemented by: UNDP, UNICEF, UNFPA and ILO 
Donors and Implementing Partners 
(amounts committed so far): 
UNDP ($5m) UNICEF ($1.55m), UNFPA ($0.7m), 
UNDP BCPR (0.7m), ILO ($0.2m) 
Partners: Ministry of Peace and Reconstructions and services 
providers 
Budget per participant RS100,000 or roughly $1,428 
Source: Project Document, UNDP factsheet "Assistance to the Peace Process" and UN staff member 
interview.  
 
UNIRP Priorities and Approach 
UNIRP has focused on the "do no harm" approach and prioritized the needs of 
FVMLRs. DDR has the potential for significant impact in the process of post-conflict 
stabilization and setting the foundation for development and the do no harm approach 
seeks to avoid any unintended negative impacts of intervention or development (United 
Nations "IDDRS" 2006, 6). As one UN staff member explained, because concerns related 
to VMLRs and MA combatants have been at the center of political tension and debate, 
UNIRP is critically analyzing the context in Nepal before acting. They are careful to 
consider decisive and connecting actors when deciding with whom to work with at the 
community level (UN staff member interview by the author June 29, 2011). Guidelines 
for the implementation of the rehabilitation packages were also prepared in consultation 
with all stakeholders and vetted through the National Technical Committee on Integration 
and Rehabilitation (unpublished UNIRP update, June-September 2011). 
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Although UNIRP is currently exploring the expansion of its gender focus to 
include male-specific needs, initially, in light of program constraints, the UN decided to 
focus on FVMLRs, considering them likely to experience doubled marginalization. The 
program document sets the goal that no FVMLR will be prevented from full participation 
in rehabilitation programming because of a gender-related constraint. This goal has 
resulted in female-specific supports developed during program implementation as 
problems are recognized.  
 
Pre-planning Phase and Discharge Process 
Orientation, a sensitization campaign, awareness raising, and consultations with 
VMLRs were not a part of the pre-planning phase due to Maoist constraints. The first 
time that UNIRP staff had contact with VMLRs in an official capacity was during the 
discharge ceremony, which was closely monitored by Maoist commanders (Piper 
interview with the author, June 22, 2011). UNIRP provided ID cards and explained 
rehabilitation options at discharge ceremonies held in January 2010. However, some 
1,700 were not in attendance as they had already left the cantonments. Maoist 
commanders claimed they left in disgust the preceding week upon hearing what the 
rehabilitation packages would entail.42 UNIRP has made contact with about 20 percent of 
the 1,700 that were absent for the official discharge ceremony, but are unaware of the 
remainder's whereabouts. Some VMLRs have reported that several of them migrated to 
Nepali and Indian urban centers looking for work (Saferworld 2010).  
                                                
42 The timing of their departure matters because the cantonments receive a monthly 





Four different packages were made available to VMLRs at the time of discharge. 
They are education, vocational training, micro and small-enterprise training, and health 
sector training. Although the packages vary in terms of length, they all operate with the 
same budget. VMLRs go through an initial career counseling session that helps them 
determine which package will best fit their needs. All participants receive a monthly 
stipend during their training period. Psychosocial support is also available through a 
network of partner agencies and over 300 participants have received this support.  
 
Education 
 The education package supports individuals to pursue formal and informal 
education. Various formal education opportunities are also available through government 
schools throughout the country. Although there was initially some trouble with the 
informal education option it has recently been reintegrated into the package.43  Hostel 
stays are facilitated for FVMLRs who have to pursue education away from home.  
 
                                                
43 Initially, there was a non-formal education component that included bridging courses 
that allowed students to make-up primary, lower secondary, or secondary education. 
Some Maoist commanders took advantage of the informal education very early in the 
program by directing groups of VMLRs to demand this option as it allowed them to study 
at a distance and only required occasional check-ins at regional centers. Their goal was to 
receive the stipend monies while maintaining command of VMLRs. When this was brought 
to the attention of Prachandra, he advised that the informal education option be 
suspended. This was done early in the program and the option reopened under tighter 
controls, in March 2011. 
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Micro and Small-enterprise 
The micro and small-enterprise development packages include technical and 
business training. Participants attend an orientation designed to help them draft a business 
plan that prepares them for success within their own community. Options are varied and 
training may include apprenticeships and follow-up training courses. Literacy and 
numeracy bridging support is also offered to individuals who require it. Training periods 
can range from two weeks to eight months depending on the course being pursued. After 




The vocational skills training package covers a wide range of vocational work. 
Training ranges from three to eight months, with many of the programs falling at the 
longer end of the range. Interviews indicated that this option is less desirable for 
FVMLRs, many of whom are lactating, pregnant, or raising children, making the longer 
training periods difficult. Additionally, there may be cultural barriers that prevent women 
from pursuing vocations that are traditionally perceived as masculine work. For example, 
included in the project document are welder, mason, and motorcycle service mechanic 




Health Services Training 
Packages similar to the health-training package have only been available in a 
handful of DDR operations (UN staff member interview by the author June 21, 2011). 
This program is different from the others in terms of its duration—two years—and the 
level of education that participants must have coming into the program. In addition to 
having passed the tenth grade, they must also pass an entrance exam to be eligible for the 
medical courses. Because women are at a greater disadvantage when it comes to 
education in Nepal there are fewer of them who meet these requirements and are eligible 
to participate in the program. However, FVMLRs who are enrolled are generally 
performing well. Most of the women enrolled in this package are unmarried and without 
children so there hasn't been much need to adjust the program as with other package 
options.  
Training for a variety of positions in the health sector is available. Unlike the 
other packages, where employment continues to be a challenge even after package 
completion, there is a high demand for medical positions in rural areas and it is expected 
that every participant will be able to find a job post-graduation.  
Of the four packages available to VMLRs, three of them have significant numbers 
of female participants. The table below summarizes the numbers of participants enrolled 








Rehabilitation package Number Enrolled Female percentage 
Vocational Training 89 0% 
Microenterprise 279 53% 
Education 373 44% 
Health Training 47 26% 




Many of the challenges faced by UNIRP are unique to the Nepali context and 
seem to have disproportionately affected women. These include the lack of government 
support, continued Maoist military command, the length of time spent in cantonments, 
and the absence of an appropriate pre-planning phase. Most of these seem to have 
disproportionately impacted women, increasing difficulties associated with their 
reintegration into civil society.44  
 
No Government Support 
A key challenge frequently identified is the lack of governmental ownership and 
national support (Piper interview with the author June 22, 2011; Molloy email 
correspondence with the author April 23, 2011; Saferworld viii, 2010). Perceiving 
                                                
44 At this point, analyses and reports have focused on anecdotal information, indicating 
the need for more quantitative research in this area.   
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themselves as proud victors, Maoist parties resent the rehabilitation program and its 
connection to DDR. They also find the program insulting, declaring that the government 
should play a greater role in the financing and delivering of services, thus honoring the 
sacrifices combatants made during the war (Saferworld 2010, vii). They believe that 
combatants deserve a reward, not rehabilitation. Non-Maoist parties are hesitant to 
support UNIRP, arguing that the program rewards violence by providing training and 
various benefits to ex-combatants while ignoring the innocent victims of war.45    
Lack of Maoist support has effectively blocked some VMLRs from participating 
in the rehabilitation program (Saferworld 2010) while disagreement between Maoist and 
non-Maoist parties has put the UN in a position of administering the program with 
virtually no support (Piper interview by the author June 22, 2011). It has also resulted in 
gross human rights violations, including the prolonged cantonment of minors with regular 
combatants.  
 
No Break in Military Command 
Although a break in the chain of command is typical for DDR operations, the MA 
continues to operate under its normal command structure (AMMAA) and continue 
regular training operations within the cantonments. There is a theoretical division 
between the political party and military commanders, but its validity is widely questioned 
                                                
45 Security sector reform (SSR) has made little progress and the state has done little to 
address the concerns of these victims. The security sector has a long history of control by 
the feudal autocratic political system and there has never been any precedent for 
maintaining civilian supremacy over security forces. Security forces are known for human 
rights abuses and focusing on their reform made increasingly difficult by the proliferation 
of armed groups throughout Nepal, especially in the Terai, since the signing of the CPA 
(Pathak and Uprety 2010). 
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(Piper interview by the author April 22, 2011). VMLRs served and trained under these 
conditions for more than two years and many continue to maintain relationship with 
commanders.  
Commanders encourage VMLRs to fight for increased benefits and encouraging 
artificially high expectations. For example, VMLRs believe that they should be 
guaranteed high paying jobs for life in spite of high unemployment rates throughout the 
country despite the fact that the current job market makes it difficult for the average 
Nepali to obtain employment (Saferworld 2010; UN staff member interview by the 
author 2011). In July of 2011, VMLRs formally requested that the government ensure 
them a, "guarantee of food, lodging, clothes, job, health and education," in addition to 
allocating a budget to help them become self-employed (My Republica "'Disqualified' 
combatants want guarantee of basic needs" 2011). Maoist commanders also discourage 
VMLRs from accepting training for work that is beneath them. For example, adamant 
that agriculture is a lower-status profession, Maoist leadership forced UNIRP to remove 
the agricultural package they initially planned to offer as a rehabilitation option. This is 
both an interesting and surprising departure from Maoism, but VMLRs and current 
combatants alike continue to protest that the government does not properly recognize 
their sacrifices. Although managing high expectations is typically part of DDR 
operations, practitioners are unused to expectations as artificially high as these (Piper, 




Length of Time in Cantonments  
Also unusual for a DDR operation is the length of time spent in cantonments. 
Many of the minors that entered the cantonments upon their creation were legal adults by 
the time they were discharged in early 2010. Regular combatants have been cantoned 
nearly five years—long enough for GIZ, the German Humanitarian Organization,46 to 
implement extensive programming within the cantonments. For example, more than 
10,000 combatants have received training, 1,500 of whom have completed training as 
health assistants ("GTZ. Supporting Measures to Strengthen the Peace Process").  
Information concerning camp conditions is extremely limited,47 but the 
encouragement of inter-caste marriage and the lack of attention paid to female 
reproductive health concerns has been noted (Saferworld 2010; UN staff interviews by 
the author 2011). Inter-caste marriages complicate re-entry into a highly socially 
stratified society and have caused a "baby boom" in cantonments. A UN radio program 
shared the experience of a UNFPA doctor who noted that pregnancies became more 
frequent as the time in cantonments progressed. Most FVMLRs are pregnant, lactating, or 
caring for small children. Pregnant women are unable to perform the military exercises 
expected of them within the camp and are therefore required to live outside the 
cantonments, so many women live in temporary shelters located just outside the 
cantonments.  
Basing policies on equity rather than equality, the MA does not address women's 
reproductive health concerns. FVMLRs experience a variety of health problems, 
                                                
46 The former GTZ is now GIZ (Duetsche Geselleschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit) 
47 Information regarding rates of SGBV is currently unavailable. 
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including high rates of uterine prolapse, a condition in which the uterus falls out of the 
body.48 This can occur when women are not provided adequate time to rest after giving 
birth and are forced to resume intense labor while their muscles are still soft. Women 
have indicated that they have gendered health needs apart from those associated with 
pregnancy that are ignored by Maoist commanders (Saferworld 2010, 9). 
 
Absence of Pre-planning Phase 
The Maoists denied the UN's request for confidential interviews with each VMLR 
prior to discharge with the result that UNIRP did not have adequate socio-economic 
profiling or relevant market information during the design of the program. The Maoists 
denied the request on the grounds that VMLRs neither needed nor desired to participate 
in the rehabilitation program (Piper interview with Mikel Dunham, April 2011). UNIRP 
staff did not have access to VMLRs until the discharge ceremony and even then it was 
not confidential. This gap prevented adequate preparation both in communities of return 
and among VMLRs. Sensitization and awareness-raising campaigns are just now being 
developed and neither VMLRs nor community members were briefed about the 
challenges often associated with the reintegration of ex-combatants. UNIRP was also 
unaware of the frequent occurrence of inter-caste marriage and pregnancy among 
FVMLRs, meaning that these needs were not initially addressed in the rehabilitation 
program.  
                                                
48 Uterine prolapse, a maternal illness where the pelvic organ, uterus or bladder 
protrudes into the vagina is encountered by a number of Nepali women. The condition is 
related to poverty and discrimination against women. Its prevalence is increased by 
several factors including early marriage and pregnancy, lack of skilled birth attendants 




Community Response: Motivation to Mitigate Challenges 
Every DDR operation faces a unique set of challenges to mitigate. Addressing 
challenges is important to sustain peace and encourage development. In Nepal, 
challenges further marginalize women who already experience the brunt of 
discrimination within the country. Some communities have not welcomed FVMLRs, 
particularly those in inter-caste marriages. Women have been disowned, coerced by 
physical violence, and even killed as a result of inter-caste marriage (Saferworld 2010, 
32).  This lack of support highlights the importance of UNIRP support.  
The fact that participation is voluntary and dependent upon VMLR initiation 
further increases the importance of mitigating challenges. Unlike traditional DDR 
programs, participation is voluntary and dependent upon VMLRs contacting the UN and 
indicating interest. Maoist interference, the inability to track VMLRs who left before the 
official discharge process, the absence of an adequate pre-planning phase, limited initial 
communications options, and the artificially high VMLR expectations have all affected 
rates of participation. Increasing program attractiveness for FVMLRs is an important 
priority because of their need for additional support in a particularly challenging 
environment. 
Discrimination within communities has been particularly difficult for those 
FVMLRs in an inter-caste marriage, a practice encouraged within cantonments.49 Many 
FVMLRs are missing legal documents including citizenship papers, marriage certificates, 
                                                
49 These marriages were both by choice and force (Saferworld 2010, xxii). 
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or birth certificates for their children, and families have refused to acknowledge inter-
caste marriages or the children of inter-caste marriage that are not legally documented.   
Discrimination affects not only the individual FVMLR, but also their families. 
For example, one UN staff member reported an incident in which the immediate family 
of one FVMLR suffered because of her marriage to a lower caste man. They were 
shunned by the larger family unit and denied their previous role of religious leadership 
within the family (unpublished internal report entitled "Case of FVMLR").  
Inter-caste marriage is a drastic departure from cultural norms but FVMLRs also 
report difficulties associated with lesser changes.50 For example, most communities 
expect women to be quiet, demure, and defer to the opinions of male family members; 
FVMLRs, however, have returned as bold, articulate, and opinionated women who are 
unwilling to renounce the freedom they experienced while serving with the PLA and 
living in the cantonments. Communities perceive FVMLRs as overly aggressive and 
sexually promiscuous and while similar opinions may be held about male VMLRs, these 
behaviors are more culturally acceptable for men (Bouta, Bannon and Frerks 2005; 
Saferworld 2010, 38 Annan and Patal 2009; Colekessian 2009; unpublished report "Case 
of the FVMLR 2010; UN staff member interviews 2011). A number for FVMLRs have 
chosen to resettle in new urban communities where they can hide past affiliation with the 
PLA. These women and their children are nearly impossible to reach, meaning that this 
highly vulnerable group has little to no access to support networks or the rehabilitation 
packages available to them (Saferworld 2010, xv). 
                                                









Piper comments that while the UNIRP rehabilitation program has faced severe 
challenges, the UN did not, "go blindly into the situation" (interview by the author July 
22, 2011). Noting the current position of women in Nepali society, increased levels of 
discrimination that are often associated with female ex-combatants and the lack of 
socioeconomic VMLR data prior to discharge, UNIRP devised a program that facilitates 
quick response as information is gathered and problems discovered in the field. Program 
strengths include adaptability and a robust gendered-approach. Weaknesses include 
inadequate social cohesion programming, the prohibitive distances that some VMLRs 
must travel for training and psychosocial care, a weak approach in terms of addressing 
the unique needs of adolescents, and a limited budget. The author faced several 
limitations that can be used as a starting point for further research.  
 
Strengths and Weaknesses  
Adaptability and a robust gendered-approach were frequently cited as program 
strengths (Piper, Molloy, Leao and UN staff member interviews July 2011). The success 




Strength: Innovation  
Adaptability and a robust gender-based approach are significant strengths of the 
UNIRP program. The UNIRP focus on adaptability facilitated a transition from a general 
approach to one that focuses on the individual. Although this is a typical pattern for any 
DDR program, the rehabilitation program in Nepal was initially more general than most 
due to the absence of a thorough pre-planning phase. UNIRP emphasizes a case 
management approach in which each participant is treated as a unique project rather than 
a component of one large project. UNIRP's unique dynamic monitoring and evaluation 
(DME) system and the rehabilitation information system (RIS) have facilitated both 
adaptability and the program's robust gender-based approach. 
 
Innovations Facilitating Adaptability 
Molloy explains that the UNIRP program was developed on a, "best guess basis," 
noting that the entire program has had to be adjusted and improved in real time during 
implementation as they receive better information (Molloy email correspondence with the 
author July 12, 2011). In other words, innovation is imperative in the Nepali context. 
DME and RIS are important programmatic components that have facilitated adaptability. 
This adaptability is key for FVMLRs because the UN was least aware of their special 
needs before discharge and because of the particularly challenging social dynamics 
involved with their reintroduction to civil society. DME and RIS allow staff to quickly 
acquire and respond to in-the-field experience. Of the innovations generated in the Nepali 
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context it seems likely that these might be the most broadly applicable to other DDR 
operations.  
The RIS is a central online information database that can be accessed from 
program headquarters and each of the regional offices. In past DDR operations, it was 
common for regional offices to maintain their own records, separate from other offices. 
This system is easily taken advantage of and has difficulty in accurately tracking program 
participants. RIS allows staff to share information efficiently and reduces the workload 
previously associated with transferring files or locating  particular information about a 
participant. It also prevents VMLRs from registering at multiple offices while granting 
them the ability to easily transfer districts should they want to move and resume their 
rehabilitation package in a new community. Each VMLR has an individual file within the 
RIS that allows staff to track services received, progress made, and changes in their 
socioeconomic status. This has particularly benefited FVMLRs because it allows UNIRP 
to respond quickly to the kinds of special needs that have been often neglected in other 
DDR programs, including pregnancy, reproductive health needs, and community 
discrimination (UN staff member interview by the author June 21, 2011). 
DME seeks to cut the time needed to respond to issues that arise in the field. One 
UN staff member reported that instead of waiting to compile reports that take weeks or 
months to generate, they are often able to respond to individual problems within 24 hours 
of discovery (interview by the author June 23, 2011). For this to work, UNIRP created a 
wide range of standardized forms, implemented daily reporting, and has promoted a 
culture of listening to the field and rapidly sharing experiences. Standardized forms are 
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an important component of DME in this context, because the sensitive political situation 
requires many decisions to be made at higher levels of management. These forms 
expedite the process so that decisions can be made quickly despite the levels of 
bureaucracy through which they must travel. DME makes use of qualitative and 
quantitative information and allows management to act in real time to provide 
authorization, guidance, or necessary additional recourses while also encouraging 
initiative at the field level (Molloy email correspondence with the author July 12, 2011).  
 
Innovations that Strengthen UNIRP's Gender Approach 
Recognizing the already difficult position of women in Nepal, UNIRP decided to 
prioritize FVMLRs, who they predicted would experience further discrimination based 
on their association with a fighting force. As the rehabilitation program enters its second 
year, women constitute 36 percent of total participants despite constituting only 30 
percent of the VMLR caseload. Although the percentage of female participants is just 
slightly higher than the percentage of female VMLRs, 36 percent is impressive when one 
considers the difficulties associated with female participation on previous DDR 
operations and that participation in this context is voluntarily. Furthermore, 45 percent of 
the total participants who are employed or self-employed are women and girls 
(Unpublished internal document "Gender Review Report"). Part of this success is due to 
additional programmatic provisions that are continually added as programmatic issues 
arise. Several programmatic elements have been added in order to mitigate challenges 
specific to FVMLRs. Because UNIRP did not have access to socioeconomic data prior to 
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the discharge process, they were unaware of the large number of FVMLRs who were 
pregnant, lactating, or caring for small children.51 Additions include nutritional support, 
childcare provision, and the implementation of a robust communications strategy.  
 
Nutrition 
 All pregnant women and lactating mothers who are currently enrolled in 
rehabilitation programs are eligible to receive Rs 50 (approximately $0.71) per day on a 
monthly basis. Additionally, up to two children per participant are eligible to receive 
baby food based on the recommendation of the UNIRP regional office (Unpublished 
information package on Special Gender and Health support for FVMLRs).  
  
Childcare 
VMLRs are required to travel to one of five regional centers for psychosocial 
counseling and may also have to spend extended periods of time away from home in 
order to participate in education or training. Noting that a lack of childcare options 
prevented some women from fully participating in the rehabilitation program, provisions 
were made for children to attend either a previously established government childcare 
center, or a center at the regional center. In the case of women who choose to bring their 
own childcare provider, an additional stipend to cover his or her living expenses is 
available.  
 
                                                
51 Exact figures are not currently available but UN staff estimated that a majority of 




  When VMLRs were discharged from cantonments, they were provided with a 
toll free number with which they could contact UNIRP if they so chose. Although 
preliminary brochures with program details were distributed prior to discharge, press and 
media conferences, additional brochures, and an SMS campaign were all developed 
during implementation. The SMS campaign is viewed as a great success because it 
allowed UNIRP to reach potential participants individually, protecting the privacy of 
VMLRs who continue to face Maoist pressure and may be hiding their true identity from 
the communities in which they now live. Additionally, this allowed UNIRP to access 
participants without contact information through the social networks connecting VMLRs 
throughout the country 
 
Weaknesses 
Navigating re-entry into potentially discriminatory communities is one of the 
program's weak points. Although the UN anticipated some difficulty in this area, 
reactions in some cases have been more severe than anticipated. Moreover, VMLRs have 
resettled in a widely dispersed geographical pattern, making community outreach and 
sensitization efforts difficult for a program with limited resources. Piper notes the 
importance of addressing this weakness stating that while FVMLRs need the support of 
the communities in which they live, those same communities need the change that 
FVMLRs bring with them. FVMLRs have been exposed to unique ideas, training, and 
education; both in the PLA and in UNIRP's rehabilitation program. They have skills and 
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expertise that will benefit the broader Nepali community. For example, one FVMLR 
completed the microenterprise package and is currently earning 3-5,000 rupees per day 
(UN staff member interview by the author June 27, 2011). Stories like this are rare in a 
country that structurally and culturally prevents women from entering the business realm. 
Hopefully more attention can be paid to the relationship between FVMLRs and their 
communities in order to set a positive pattern for future gender equality. 
Also related to the wide geographical resettlement pattern, some VMLRs have 
found travel associated with the program prohibitive to participation. Psychosocial care, 
health training programs, microenterprise training and follow-up are currently available 
only at the regional centers. This presents a particular challenge to pregnant and lactating 
mothers or women caring for small children.52 Although childcare is available upon 
arrival, some participants fail to return for follow-up exercises.  
The majority of minors serving in the PLA were between the ages of 14 and 18 
and many were legal adults at the time of discharge. Educational UNICEF brochures 
thoroughly address the issue of returning child soldiers, but very few of the VMLRS are 
children—most are adolescents closer to adulthood than they are to childhood. This being 
said, they still have needs that are unique compared to adults (Piper interview by the 
author June 22, 2011). Programming focused on the needs of children and the needs of 
adults and was not able to adequately address the needs of those hovering between 
childhood and adulthood (Leao interview by the author June 20, 2011).  
                                                
52 UNIRP is currently exploring options to bring trainings and psychosocial care to 
participants in their communities, but this idea has not yet materialized. 
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Finally, Piper, Leao and UN staff members all referenced the financial limitations 
of the program as a weakness. Program participants have also noted that the stipends 
provided them are not enough to cover their basic expenses. UNIRP cannot spend more 
than Rs 100,000 (approximately $1,428) per participant. Some of the programs require 
additional supplies such as uniforms and training materials, which must also come out of 
this budget. Although there is little that can be done to change this weakness, a larger 
rehabilitation budget should be encouraged for currently cantoned combatants.  
 
Summary 
 Unique challenges including, no government support, continued Maoist military 
command, the length of cantonment, and the absence of a thorough pre-planning phase 
were drivers for innovation. General programmatic innovations include DME and the 
RIS. Innovations specific to gender-based programming include supplemental nutritional 
support and the provision of childcare. Although these elements were developed in 
Nepal's distinctive context, their general applicability should be considered for more 
traditional DDR operations around the world.  
 
Recommendations for Future Research  
 As with any research project, the author encountered a number of 
limitations while gathering the information for this case study. However, they point the 
way to potential research projects in the future that can benefit both Nepal and DDR 




• Some information is restricted due to the sensitive and ongoing nature of 
the rehabilitation program. For example, the precise number of FVMLRs 
who have accessed psychosocial support or reported social discrimination, 
or SGBV as a result of discrimination is unavailable at this time.  
• Limited financial resources coupled with time constraints on the part of 
the author and UN staff prevented travel to regional offices. 
• A true program analysis would include interviews with all of the 
stakeholders in this process including constitutional parties, program 
participants, and community members. The results of this case study are 
confined to the perspective of UN staff working in Nepal.  
• Although the case study method offers several benefits, particularly for 
qualitative analysis, it also has certain drawbacks, including little in the 
way of a quantitative contribution. 
• Some key staff members were unavailable for interview during the 
author's time in Nepal. 
 
Research Recommendations  
Some information has been gathered regarding psychosocial trauma encountered 
by FVMLRs during service with the PLA while cantoned and since discharge, but there 
has not been a systematic study addressing these issues. One UN staff member suspected 
that a great deal of trauma has gone unreported and therefore is not properly addressed 
through the rehabilitation program (Interview by the author June 13 2011). Due to 
fragility of post-conflict Nepal, the results of such a study would likely remain 
confidential, but greatly improve programs that target FVMLRs. 
This case study revolves around the perspective of staff that is primarily located 
in Kathmandu, Nepal. Considering the impact of UNIRP innovations from a regional and 
community level is important if their success is to be truly measured. The high 
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participation of FVMLRs is a positive indication, but more research is certainly required 
for a definitive analysis of success.  
Finally, considering the programmatic gap regarding the relationship between 
FVMLRs and the community, potential modalities for sensitization and social cohesion 
initiatives are also necessary. UN staff members indicated that there has been little to no 
research done in this area and indicated its importance considering the extreme 
discrimination faced by some FVMLRs upon return. This would likely be a complex 
endeavor, as it would seek to understand changes in perception associated with conflict. 
These perceptions need to be examined at both the community and combatant level in 










Acharya, Avidit. "The Maoist Insurgency and the Political Economy of Violence." In The 
Maoist Insurgency in Nepal: Revolution in the Twenty-first Century, edited by 
Mahendra Lawoti and Anup K. Pahari, 263-84. London: Routledge, 2010.  
  
Agreement on Monitoring of the Management of Arms and Armies (AMMAA), Signed 
November 28, 2006.  
  
Amnesty International. "Nepal: New Government Must Deliver on Past Human Rights 
Commitments As Part of the Peace Process and State Restructuring | Amnesty 
International USA." Amnesty International USA | Protect Human Rights. 




Annan, Jeannie, and Ana Cutter Patel. "Critical Issues and Lessons in Social 
Reintegration: Balancing Justice, Psychological Well Being, and Community 
Reconciliation." May 2009. www.ciddr.org.  
  
Ariño, María Villellas. "Nepal: a Gender View of the Armed Conflict and the Peace 
Process." Quaderns De Construcció De Pau 4 (June 2008).  
  
Arnson, Cynthia. "The Political Economy of War." In Rethinking the Economics of War: 
the Intersection of Need, Creed, and Greed, edited by Cynthia Arnson and I. 
William. Zartman, 1-22. Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2005.  
  
Australian Government Aid Program, Canada, Embassy of Denmark, Department for 
International Development, Delegation of the European Union to Nepal, Embassy 
of Finland, Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany, JICA, Norwegian 
Embassy, SNV, Embassy of Switzerland, USAID, and United Nations. Nepal 
Peace and Development Strategy: A Contribution to Planning from Nepal's 
International Development Partners. Report. Kathmandu: United Nations 
Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator's Office, 2011.  
  
Bouta, Tsjeard, Ian Bannon, and Georg Frerks. Gender, Conflict, and Development. 
Washington, DC: World Bank, 2005.  
  
Cameron, Mary M. On the Edge of the Auspicious: Gender and Caste in Nepal. Urbana: 
 
57 
University of Illinois Press, 1998.  
 
 CARE. From Resolution to Reality: Lessons Learned from Afghanistan, Nepal and 
Uganda on Women's Participation in Peacebuilding and Post-conflict 
Governance. CARE, 2010. 
 
Case of the FVMLR. Unpublished Internal Document. UNIRP, 2010.  
  
Colekessian, Ani. Reintegrating Gender: A Gendered Analysis of the Nepali 
Rehabilitation Process. Working paper. Gender, Peace and Security. Santo 
Domingo: United Nations International Research and Training Institute for the 
Advancement of Women, 2009.  
  
Collier, Paul, and Anke Hoeffler. "On Economic Causes of Civil War." Oxford Economic 
Papers 50, no. 4 (1998): 563-73.  
  
Cottle, Drew, and Angela Keys. "The Maoist Conflict in Nepal: a Himalayan Perdition?" 
Australian Journal of International Affairs 61, no. 2 (June 2007): 168-74. 
doi:10.1080/10357710701358337.  
  
De Sales, Anne. "The Kham Magar Country, Nepal: Between Ethnic Claims and 
Maoism." European Bulletin of Himalayan Research 19 (2000): 41-72.  
  
Dhakal, Ameet. "The People's Liberation Army (PLA)." In The Nepali Security Sector: 
an Almanac, edited by Bishnu Sapkota, 139-53. Geneva: Centre for the 
Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2009.  
  
Do, Quy-Toan, and Lakshmi Iyer. "Poverty, Social Divisions and Conflict in Nepal." 
Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard Business School 7, no. 2 
(April 2007).  
  
Doyle, Michael W., and Nicholas Sambanis. Making War and Building Peace: United 
Nations Peace Operations. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006.  
  
Drezner, Daniel W. "Introduction: The Interaction of International and Domestic 
Institutions." Introduction to Locating the Proper Authorities: the Interaction of 
Domestic and International Institutions, 1-22. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan 
Press, 2003.  
  
Eck, Kristine. "Recruiting Rebels: Indoctirnation and Political Education in Nepal." In 
The Maoist Insurgency in Nepal: Dynamics and Growth in the Twenty-first 
Century, 33-51. New York: Routledge, 2009.  
  
Gamba, Virginia. "Post-Agreement Demobilization, Disarmament, and Reintegration: 
 
58 
Toward a New Approach." In Violence and Reconstruction, edited by John 
Darby, 53-76. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame, 2006.  
  
"GTZ. Supporting Measures to Strengthen the Peace Process." GTZ.Startseite. Accessed 
July 16, 2011. http://www.gtz.de/en/weltweit/asien-pazifik/nepal/23441.htm.  
  
Gurung, Harka. Social Exclusion and Maoist Insurgency. Paper Presented at National 
Dialogue on the ILO Convention 169 on Indigenous and Tribal People, 
Kathmandu Nepal, 12-20 Janurary 2005.  
  
Harbom, Lotta, and Peter Wallensteen. "Armed Conflicts, 1946-2009." Journal of Peace 
Research 47, no. 4 (2010): 501-09.  
  
Hatlebakk, Magnus. Explaining Maoist Control and Level of Civil Conflict in Nepal. 
Working paper. Bergan: CMI, 2009.  
  
"Interview with Desmond Molloy, Senior Rehabilitation Advisor in Nepal." E-mail 
interview by author. April 13, 2011.  
  
"Interview with Isabella Leao, DDR Specialist and Consultant." Interview by author. 
June 20, 2011.  
  
"Interview with Robert Piper, United Nations Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator, 
Top UN Official in Nepal and the Director of the UN Country Team." Interview 
by author. July 22, 2011.  
  
"Interviews with UN Staff Members." Interview by author. June 2011.  
  
Joshi, Madhav. "Between Clientelistic Dependency and Liberal Market Economy: Rural 
Support for the Maoist Insurgency in Nepal." Edited by Mahendra Lawoti and 
Anup K. Pahari. In The Maoist Insurgency in Nepal: Revolution in the Twenty-
first Century, 92-111. London: Routledge, 2010.  
  
Krause, Keith. "Human Security." In Post-conflict Peacebuilding: a Lexicon, edited by 
Vincent Chetail, 147-57. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.  
  
Lawoti, Mahendra, and Unup K. Pahari. "Violent Conflict and Change: Costs and 
Benefits of the Maoist Rebellion in Nepal." In The Maoist Insurgency in Nepal: 
Dynamics and Growth in the Twenty-first Century, edited by Mahendra Lawoti, 
304-26. New York: Routledge, 2009.  
  
Lawoti, Mahendra. "Bullets, Ballots, and Bounty: Maoist Electoral Victory in Nepal." In 
The Maoist Insurgency in Nepal: Revolution in the Twenty-first Century, edited 




Lawoti, Mahendra. "Evolution and Growth of the Maoist Insurgency in Nepal." In The 
Maoist Insurgency in Nepal: Revolution in the Twenty-first Century, edited by 
Mahendra Lawoti and Anup K. Pahari, 3-30. London: Routledge, 2010.  
  
Lijphart, Arend. "Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method." The American 
Political Science Review 65, no. 3 (September 1971): 682-93. JSTOR.  
  
Marks, Thomas A., and David Scott Palmer. "Radical Maoist Insurgents and Terrorist 
Tactics: Comparing Peru and Nepal." Low Intensity Conflict & Law Enforcement 
13, no. 2 (2005): 91-116. doi:10.1080/09662840500347280.  
   
Mershed, S. Mansood, and Scott Gates. "Spatial-Horizontal Inequality and the Maoist 
Insurgency in Nepal." Review of Development Economics 9, no. 1 (2005): 121-34.  
  
Metz, John J. "Development in Nepal: Investment in the Status Quo." GeoJournal 35, no. 
2 (1995): 175-84. doi:10.1007/BF00814063.  
  
Molloy, Desmond. "DDR: A Shifting Paradigm & the Scholar/Practitioner Gap." 
Canadian Peacekeeping Press of Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, Autumn 2009.  
  
Molloy, Desmond. E-mail to Sarabeth Harrelson. April 13, 2011.  
  
Muggah, Robert. "Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration." In Post-conflict 
Peacebuilding: a Lexicon, edited by Vincent Chetail, 123-37. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009.  
  
Murshed, S. Mansoob, and Scott Gates. "Spatial-Horizontal Inequality and the Maoist 
Insurgency in Nepal." Review of Development Economics 9, no. 1 (2005): 121-34. 
doi:10.1111/j.1467-9361.2005.00267.x.  
   
My Republica. "'Disqualified' Combatants Want Guarantee of Basic Needs, Job." 
MYREPUBLICA.com - News in Nepal: Fast, Full & Factual. July 6, 2011. 




Nepal. Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction. National Action Plan On Implementation 
of the United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1325 & 1820 [2010/11-
2015/16]. Singha Durbar, Kathmandu: Government of Nepal, Ministry of Peace 
and Reconstruction, 2011.  
  
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. Nepal: 2010 Humanitarian 




Ohiorhenuan, John F. E., and Frances Stewart. Post-conflict Economic Recovery: 
Enabling Local Ingenuity. New York: United Nations Development Programme, 
Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, 2008.  
  
Pathak, Bishnu, and Devendra Uprety. Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration 
and Security Sector Reform in Nepal: A Preliminary Sociological Observation. 
Report no. 90. Kathmandu: Conflict Study Center, 2010.  
  
Pouligny, Béatrice. "Local Ownership." In Post-conflict Peacebuilding: a Lexicon, edited 
by Vincent Chetail, 174-87. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.  
  
Returned, Child Soldiers of Nepal's Maoist Army. Directed by Robert Koenig. 
Watertown, MA: Documentary Educational Resources, 2010. DVD.  
  
Riaz, Ali, and Subho Basu. Paradise Lost?: State Failure in Nepal. Lanham: Lexicon 
Books, 2007.  
  
Rothchild, Donald. "Settlement Terms and Postagreement Stability." Edited by Donald 
Rothchild and Elizabeth M. Cousens. In Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace 
Agreements, edited by Stephen John Stedman, 117-38. Boulder: Lyne Rienner 
Publishers, 2002.  
  
Saferworld. Common Ground? Gendered Assesment of the Needs and Concerns of 
Maoist Army Combatants for Rehabilitation and Integration. Report. Saferworld, 
2010.  
  
Sari Soldiers. Directed by Julie Bridgham and Ramyata Limbu. Butter Lamp Films, 
2008. DVD.  
  
Schneiderman, Sara. "The Path to Jan Sakar in Dolakha District: Toward an Ethnography 
of the Maoist Movement"" In Himalayan People's War: Nepal's Maoist 
Rebellion, edited by Turin Mark, 77-111. Bloomington: BIndiana University 
Press, 2004.  
  
Secretary General. Women's Participation in Peacebuilding: Report of the Secretary-
General. Report. A/65/354-S/2010/466. United Nations, 2010.  
  
Sharma, Mandira, and Dinesh Prasain. "Gender Dimensions of the People's War: 
Reflections on the Experiences of Rural Women." In Himalayan People's War: 
Nepal's Maoist Rebellion, 152-65. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004.  
  
Simpson, J. A., and E. S. C. Weiner. The Oxford English Dictionary. Oxford: Clarendon 




Special Gender and Health Support for Rehabilitation of FVMLRs (information 
Package). Unpublished Internal Document. Kathmandu: UNIRP, 2010.  
  
Specker, Leontine. "The R-Phase of DDR Processes." Netherlands Institute of 
International Relations 'Clingendael' September 2008. 
http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/2008/20080900_cru_report_specker.pdf.  
  
Stankovic, Tatjana, Stina Torjenson, and Tone Bleie. Fresh Insights on Disarmament, 
Demobilization and Reintegration: A Survey for Practitioners in Nepal. Centre 
For Peace Studies Tromso University, Norway, 2010.  
  
Stewart, Frances. Horizontal Inequalities and Conflict: Understanding Group Violence in 
Multiethnic Societies. Basingstoke [England: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.  
  
Suhrke, Astri. "Virtues of a Narrow Mission: The UN Peace Operation in Nepal." Global 
Governance 17 (Spring 2011): 37-55.  
  
Support to the Rehabilitation of Verified Minors and Late Recruits, Now Called UN 
Interagency Rehabilitation Programme. Standard Joint Programme Document. 
Kathmandu: United Nations, 2010.  
  
Tamang, Seira. "The Politics of Conflict and Difference or the Difference of Conflict in 
Politics: the Women's Movement in Nepal." Feminist Review 91, no. 1 (2009): 
61-80. doi:10.1057/fr.2008.50.  
 
Tiwari, Bishwa Nath. "An Assessment of the Causes of Conflict in Nepal." In The Maoist 
Insurgency in Nepal: Revolution in the Twenty-first Century, edited by Mahendra 
Lawoti and Anup K. Pahari, 241-62. London: Routledge, 2010.  
  
Tiwari, Bishwa Nath., Yash Ghai, Sarah Levit-Shore, and Lok Raj Baral. Nepal Human 
Development Report 2009 State Transformation and Human Development. 
Kathmandu: United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Nepal, 2009.  
  
Türk, Volker. "Capacity-building." In Post-conflict Peacebuilding: a Lexicon, edited by 
Vincent Chetail, 34-47. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.  
  
United Nations Children's Fund. UNICEF Humanitarian Action: Preparing for Children 
in Emergencies. New York: UNICEF, 2010.  
  
United Nations Country Team Nepal, and Government of Nepal. United Nations 
Development Assistance Framework for Nepal. Kathmandu: UN, 2007.  
  
United Nations Country Team Nepal. Common Country Assessment for Nepal. 
 
62 
Kathmandu: United Nations, 2007.  
  
United Nations Development Program. Assistance to the Peace Process: UN Interagency 
Rehabilitation Program. Fact Sheet. Kathmandu, 2010.  
  
United Nations Development Programme, UNDP. "Poverty Reduction – Programme — 
UNDP in Nepal." UNDP in Nepal. February 2011. Accessed March 18, 2011. 
http://www.undp.org.np/poverty/projects/lrp/index.php?ProgramID=114.  
  
United Nations Interagency Rehabilitation Programme. UNIRP Bi-weekly Report 
(reporting Period: 16-31 May 2011). Unpublished Internal Document. 
Kathmandu, 2011.  
  
United Nations. Operational Guide to the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and 
Reintegration Standards. [New York]: UN, 2010.  
  
United Nations Peace Fund for Nepal. United Nations Peace Fund for Nepal (UNPFN) 
Project Status Update as of (June-Sep 2010). Unpublished Internal Document. 
Kathmandu, 2010.  
  
United Nations Population Fund Nepal. "United Nations Population Fund - UNFPA 
Nepal." Home | United Nations Population Fund - UNFPA Nepal. 2011. Accessed 
July 12, 2011. http://nepal.unfpa.org/en/programmes/reproductive.php.  
  
United Nations. United Nations Country Team, Nepal. Annual Report-2009, United 
Nations Development Assistance Framework for Nepal (2008-2012). Kathmandu: 
United Nations, 2009.  
  
United Nations. United Nations Country Team, Nepal. United Nations Country Team 
(2007) United Nations Development Assistance Framework for Nepal 2008-2010. 
Kathmandu: United Nations, 2007.  
 
United Nations. United Nations Interagency Rehabilitation Program. "Extended 
Assistance for Ex-combatants to Begin a New Life." News release, March 7, 
2011. United Nations Development Programme News Updates. Accessed July 14, 
2011. http://www.undp.org.np/newsroom/details.php?n=1309. 
  
United Nations. United Nations Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator's Office. Nepal 
Peace and Development Strategy 2010-2015. Kathmandu: United Nations 
Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator's Office, 2011.  
  
United States. US Agency for International Development. Conducting a Conflict 
Assessment: a Framework for Strategy and Program Development: Conflict 
Management and Mitigation. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Agency for International 
 
63 
Development, Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation, 2004.  
  
Upreti, Bishnu R., and Ulrike Müller-Böker. Livelihood Insecurity and Social Conflict in 
Nepal. Publication. Kathmandu: South Asia Regional Coordination Office and the 
Swiss National Centre of Competence in Research, 2010.  
  
Upreti, Bishnu Raj. "External Engagement in Nepal's Armed Conflict." In The Maoist 
Insurgency in Nepal: Revolution in the Twenty-first Century, edited by Mahendra 
Lawoti and Anup K. Pahari, 219-37. London: Routledge, 2010.  
  
Wennmann, Achim. Socio-Economic Inequalities and Peace in Nepal. Working paper no. 
2. Geneva: Centre on Conflict, Development and Peacebuilding (CCDP), 2009.  
  
Yami, Hisila. People's War and Women's Liberation in Nepal. Kathmandu: Janadhwani 
Publication, 2007.  
  
Zartman, I. Willian. "Need, Creed and Greed in Intrastate Conflict I." In Rethinking the 
Economics of War: the Intersection of Need, Creed, and Greed, edited by Cynthia 
Arnson and I. William. Zartman, 256-84. Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson 
Center Press, 2005.  
 
64 
Appendix A: List of Commonly Used Acrynms 
AMMAA Agreement on Monitoring of the Management of Arms and Armies 
BCPR Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery  
CAAFAG Children Associated with Armed Forces and Armed Groups 
CPA Comprehensive Peace Agreement 
DME Dynamic Monitoring and Evaluation 
FVMLR Female Verified Minor or Late Recruit 
IDDRS International Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration Standards  
ILO International Labour Organisation 
IO International Organization 
MA Maoist Army 
NA Nepal Army 
PLA People's Liberation Army 
RIS Rehabilitation Information System 
RNA Royal Nepal Army  
SSR Security Sector Reform 
UN United Nations 
UNDP United Nations Development Programme 
UNFPA United Nations Population Fund 
UNIRP United Nations Interagency Rehabilitation Program 
UNPFN United Nations Peace Fund for Nepal 






Appendix B: Timeline of Significant Events 
18th century Prithvi Narayan Shah unifies three rival kingdoms, creating 
Nepal. 
1854 Rana dynasty formally codifies the caste system in Nepal 
April 1949 Communist leader Pushpa Lal translates the Communist 
Manifesto into Nepali. 
1955 Nepal joins the UN. 
1959 Multi-party constitution is adopted. 
1960 King Mahendra seizes control, suspending parliament, the 
constitution and party politics after Nepali Congress Party wins 
elections.  
1980 Constitutional referendum is held following agitation for 
reform. The king agrees to allow direct elections to a national-
assembly but on a non-party basis. 
1985 Nepal Communist Party (Maoist) begin civil disobedience 
campaign for the restoration of multi-party system. 
1990  Pro-democracy agitation leads to street protests and deaths. 
The king agrees to a new democratic constitution. 
February 1996 The CPN-M begin their insurgency. 
June 1, 2001 King Birendra and members of his family are shot to death by 
the crown prince. 
July 2001 The government and Maoists agree to a truce 
November 23, 2001 Peace talks fail and Maoists launch attacks on army and police 
posts. 
October 4, 2002 The king dismisses the prime minister and assumes executive 
power. 
January 2003 Government and Maoists declare a ceasefire. 
August 2003 Maoists pull out of peace talks and end truce. 
February 1, 2005 King Gyanendra dismisses the government and assumes direct 
power. 
September 2005 Maoists declare a three-month ceasefire 
November 22 2005 Maoist and Seven Party Alliance (SPA) agree on a common 
platform fro restoring democracy. 
January 2006 Maoists ended a four-moth ceasefire 
April 5, 2006 The people's movement starts with the SPA general strike and 
Maoist blockades.  
April 24, 2006 King Gyanendra surrenders power and agrees to reinstate 
parliament after street protests.  
April 26, 2006 Maoists announce a unilateral three-month ceasefire. 
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May 26, 2006 Maoists and SPA sign ceasefire code of conduct. 
July 2, 2006 SPA writes to the Secretary-General proposing 
decommissioning of Maoist arms. 
July 24, 2006 Maoists write to UN protesting SPA's letter with reference to 
decommissioning. 
July 27-August 3, 2006 UN assessment mission visits Nepal. 
August 9 2006 Maoists and SPA send parallel letters to UN Secretary-General 
requesting monitoring of arms and elections. 
August 25, 2006 Ian Martin is appointed as the Secretary-General's personal 
representative to Nepal. 
October 29, 2006 Ceasefire is extended for three months. 
November 8, 2006 Agreement on the Monitoring of the Management of Arms and 
Armies is signed by the Maoists and SPA. 
December 16, 2006 The Maoists and SPA agreed on the interim constitution. 
January 15, 2007 An interim constitution is adopted by Nepal's House of 
Representatives, which dissolves itself to make way for the 
interim parliament.  
March 7, 2007 UNMIN completes registering and storing the weapons of 
Maoist forces. 
April 1, 2007 An interim government is established consisting of eight 
political parties, including the Maoists.  
April 12, 2007 UNMIN completes registering and storing the weapons of the 
Nepal Army. 
June 14, 2007 UNMIN begins second phase of registering and verifying 
former Maoist combatants and their weapons. 
June 24, 2007 The interim government agrees to hold elections for the 
constituent assembly on November 22.  
September 9, 2007 Bombs explode in Kathmandu for the first time since the 
August 2006 peace agreement. 
September 14, 2007 5,000 soldiers leave their camps to protest wages lower than 
those paid to soldiers in the Nepali Army.  
September 26, 2007 The Nepali Congress party passes a resolution calling on the 
special assembly to be elected in November to order the king 
to give up his throne.  
October 5, 2007 Constituent assembly elections, set for November 22 are 
indefinitely deferred. 
April 10, 2008 The constituent elections are held. The Maoists emerge as the 
single largest party. Four people are killed on polling day. 
May 19, 2008 UNMIN condemns the killing of a local businessman, Ram 
Hari Shrestha, inside the Maoist cantonment as a breach of 
commitments made in the Agreement on Monitoring the 
Management of Arms and Armies (AMMAA). 
May 28, 2008 The Constituent Assembly convenes for the first time and 
proclaims Nepal a republic. 
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June 20 2008 Seven Maoist ministers resign collectively during a meeting of 
the seven ruling parties after negotiations failed to break the 
deadlock over the formation of government. 
October 21, 2008 Agreement is reached by all parties to form a special 
committee for the integration and rehabilitation of the Maoist 
combatants. 
October 22, 2008 Key parties objected to a member of the CPN-M heading the 
committee as PLA combatants would be a part of the 
integration process.  
March 2, 2009 In response to the February announcement by the NA that it 
had recruited 3,000 new troops, the PLA announces it will 
begin recruiting to fill the positions of 12,000 troops 
disqualified by UNMIN's verification process 
March 13, 2009 The Supreme Court upholds a challenge to the recruitment by 
the Nepalese army and orders them to cease recruiting. . 
May 4 2009 Maoist Prime Minister "Prachanda" resigns after the President 
blocks his firing of the army chief 
August 24, 2009 19 armed ex-Maoist soldiers verified as combatants are 
arrested outside of cantonments in Kapilvastu district with 
weapons registered by UNMIN 
September 1, 2009 The Constitutional Committee is tasked with preparing the 
final constitution draft from the submissions of 11 thematic 
committees met for the first time since the new government 
was formed 
December 14-17, 2009 Radhika Coomaraswamy visits Nepal to try to accelerate the 
release of VMLRs 
December 16, 2009 The Nepalese government and the UCPN-M sign an action 
plan committing both sides to release the former child 
combatants over a forty-day period starting in early 2010. 
January 7, 2010 VMLR discharge process begins. 




Appendix C: 40-point Maoist Demand, February 1996, organized by theme 
 
 
